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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from the district court's appellate review affirming the trial court's 
decision. Stacy Gustafson now Stacy Loughmiller ("Stacy") and Mark Gustafson ("Mark") were 
married for 12 years, having two children. They divorced December 15, 2009. Everything was 
stipulated in a Memorandum of Understanding, but the case was heard in front of a judge. 
Child support was set at $385 per month at income of $311,894. Child support was set low at 
that level of income because Mark wanted the alimony to be scaled at a higher level so that he 
could write it off. Spousal support averaged $90,000 per year. The Decree provided that child 
support was to be reviewed after spousal support ended December 31, 2012. The parties split all 
the living expenses equally during those three years of spousal support. Living expenses were 
attached to the MOU at $127,726 per year, around $10,000 per month. 
After spousal maintenance ended, Mark did not voluntarily raise the child support, so 
Stacy was required to file a formal Petition to Modify Child Support on March 18, 2013. The 
Decree did not assign the income tax exemptions for the children to either party. 
Trial was held April 11, 2014 before Magistrate Terry McDaniel to update the child 
support amount. Both parties testified and were cross examined. The combined income at trial 
was $588,000. The Court ordered child support at $1,731.53 per month, although the 
Modification Judgment ordered $1,726 per month in child support payable by Mark. The 
magistrate refused to consider child support on combined income exceeding $300,000 and 
1 
presumed the child support amount calculated on $300,000 was the correct amount to be paid. 
Stacy appealed to the district court. The ruling was affirmed. Stacy appeals to this Court. 
No attorney's fees have been awarded to either party, although they both requested them. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
When the District Court acts as an appellate court reviewing the decisions of a 
magistrate, the Supreme Comi reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether 
there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and 
whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 
Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.2d 214, 217-18 (2013). If those findings are so supported and the 
conclusions follow there from, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we 
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id. Thus, the appellate courts do not 
review the decision of the magistrate. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,529,284 P.3d 970, 973 
(2012). Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. 
Id. 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower comi acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
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and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping 
Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
The standard of review on an appeal from a child support award is whether the court 
abused its discretion. See Reidv. Reid, 121 Idaho 15, 16,822 P.2d 534,535 (1992). A support 
award will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Ross v. Ross, I 03 
Idaho 406,409,648 P.2d 1119, 1122 (1982). 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Original Divorce Facts 
1. The Affidavit oflncome at the time of the divorce, December 15, 2009, shows Mark's 
income at $300,000 and Stacy's imputed income at $15,080. (R. p. 27)1 
2. Child support was set at $385 because Mark wanted the alimony to be scaled at a higher level 
so that he could write it off. (Tr., p. 45, Ls. 4-11.)2 
3. Two months prior to Kate's birth on November 11, 2000, both parents agreed that Stacy 
would stop working outside the home and would stay home and raise their children. (Tr. p. 
30., Ls. 6-24.) 
4. The parties moved to Idaho in 2003 with net proceeds from the sale of their house of 
$631,589. (Exhibit 12.) 
5. Mark's income for 2006 was $223,873, in 2007 was $252,150, and in 2008 was $297,960. 
(Tr. p. 41, L. 17 -p. 42, L. 3.). 
1 All citations to R ... refers to the Clerks Record comprising everything in the CVDR-09-22353 
Court File 
2 All citations to "Tr." in this briefrefer to the155-page Original Transcript which includes 
transcripts of the March 24, 2014 and April 11, 2014 pretrial and trial heard before Honorable 
Te1ry McDaniel in the magistrate court .. 
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6. Stacy's was to continue caring for the children during the day after the divorce for three 
years. (R. p. 000043.) 
7. The MOU attached to the Decree, states that all living expenses will be equally divided for 
the three years that spousal support is paid. The living expenses were $127,726 per year, 
$10,644 per month. (R. 000049-000051) 
8. The MOU attached to the Decree under Spousal Support states, The Father agrees to pay the 
Mother spousal support for a three year term commencing January 1, 2010. The support 
figure is to be determined as follows: 
a. During the calendar year of 2010, the parties agree that the Mother shall receive 50% 
of Father's bi-monthly distribution paid upon receipt of distribution (6 payments per 
year). (R. - 000039.) 
b. Commencing January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2012, Mother shall receive 50% 
of Father's bi-monthly distribution paid upon receipt of distribution with a maximum 
payment of $13,000 per distribution period (6 payments per year for a total of 
$78,000 a year maximum). (R. - 000039.) 
9. If Mother chose to go back to work her income plus spousal maintenance could not exceed 
$150,000. (R. - 000039.) 
10. Mark had to purchase Stacy's interest in CAPROCK stock upon divorce as property 
settlement. Mark is paying $2,844 per month for ten years. (R. -000048) 
Case - Re Opened to Modify Child Support 
11. Stacy hired Mr. Bevis because Mark asked her to seek counsel regarding imputed income. 
(Tr. p. 49, Ls. 7-19.) 
12. Stacy sent Mark an email on March 18, 2013 telling Mark, he could look at the Quicken 
records ifhe wanted to see them. Mark never responded. (Exhibit 39) 
13. Mark's motion to compel discovery, production of documents, stated Stacy was to comply 
with I.R.C.P. 34 . (R. p. 87.) 
14. Stacy was only compelled to produce documents. Quicken was not specifically requested in 
the first request for production. (R. pp. 87-89.) 
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15. The Record shows that there was no notice filed with the court for any supplemental 
production of Quicken after the deposition and prior to trial. (R., p.3.) 
16. The Magistrate ordered a pre-trial conference. (R., p.93.) 
17. The Magistrate directed the submission of pre-trial memoranda to be submitted to Court no 
later than 5 days before the final pre-trial conference. (R., p.94.) 
18. Mark's pre-trial memorandum stated that there are no facts that support the income over 
$300,000 from applying in this case. (R., p. 108.) 
19. Stacy's pre-trial memorandum stated that she will present evidence including Mark's 
resources, the standard of living the children enjoyed during the marriage, the physical and 
emotion needs of the children including their education, and the special talents and abilities 
of the children and the cost of education or training those abilities. (R., p.125.) 
20. At the pre trial, Stacy's counsel stated that there was a budget, and Mark's counsel said that 
there might be some questions about that budget. (CORR. Tr., p. 15, L. 23 -p. 16, L. 3.)3 
21. The Magistrate responded to the mention of the word budget: 
THE COURT: Well I'm only worried about the budget during the marriage, 
how much of the child's expenses during the marriage, 
what they're used to during the marriage. (CORR.Tr., p. 16, Ls. 4-15; R., p.351.) 
22. Stacy's counsel responded that the standard ofliving was from $200,000 during the 
marriage. That's what I have in my file. (R., pp.217, 351.) 
Trial Testimony 
23. Stacy's imputed income was $38,000 (Tr., p.23, Ls. 12-22.) 
24. Mark's 2010 income was $399,834 (Exhibit 6) 
25. Mark's 2011 income was: $434,429 (Exhibit 7) 
3
AII citations to "CORR. Tr." in this brief refer to the21-page CORRECTEDTranscript which includes the 
corrected transcript of the March 24, 2014 pretrial conference heard before Honorable Terry McDaniel 
in the magistrate court .. 
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26. Mark's 2012 income $471,034 (Tr. p. 39, L. 22 - p. 40., L. 3.) 
27. Mark's 2013 income was $550,000. (Tr., p.23, Ls. 12-22.) 
28. Mark does not understand the difference between getting paid every two weeks, versus twice 
a month. (Tr. p. 106, Ls. 1-25.) 
29. Mark does not know how many times a year he gets paid, 24 or 26. He just gets a direct 
deposit into his checking account. (Tr. p. 106, Ls. 20-25.) 
30. Mark thinks he received his salary from $15,625 to $18,750 every pay period beginning 
January 1, 2014. (Tr. p. 108, Ls. 10-17.) 
31. Mark is the co-Chief Investment Officer for CAPROCK where he performs due diligence. 
(Tr. p. 119, Ls. 19-24.) 
32. Mark's job is to analyze their client's existing portfolio when they come to CAPROCK, and 
help them formulate the type of asset allocation they prefer (Tr. 120XXX) 
33. Mark can afford a lifestyle consistent with an income in excess of $500,000, and belongs to 
Spurwing Country Club.(Tr. p. 116, Ls.9-18.) 
34. Stacy has not been able to meet the needs of the children since alimony ended. Stacy has 
been spending the $2,844 per month property settlement, plus savings of $25,000 from 
January 1, 2013 to trial April 11, 2014, plus her new husband has also been contributing 
unsaid amount. (Tr. p. 90, L.2-p. 91, L.14.) 
35. Mark offered to pay 100% of all health expenses at trial, and Stacy accepted. Id That is only 
6% more his 94% pro-rata percentage. Medical Insurance was $4,480 per year. (R. -
000108) Medical expenses during the Marriage was $2,640 per year. (R. -000050). 6% is 
$427 per year, $36 per month. 
36., Stacy and Mark filed separate tax returns in 2009 because they got divorced December 15, 
2009. (Tr. p. 42, Ls. 4-9.) 
37. Stacy's 2009 tax return shows income of $152,506. She was not working. Stacy and Mark 
split his income for that year in preparing their tax returns. (Tr. p. 42, Ls.6-22.) 
38. Stacy's profession is listed as HOMEMAKER on the 2009 tax return. (Exhibit 10, last page) 
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39. Spousal maintenance was $115,000 for 2010, $78,000 for 2011, $78,000 for 2012, (Tr., p. 
43, L.24 - p. 44, L. 7.) 
40. At the appeal hearing, the district judge stated that he uses Quicken, and inferred one doesn't 
The Quicken database was populated with Stacy and Mark's financial transactions 
do\\>nloaded from the Internet/online, rather than hand inputting that data from physical bank 
and credit card statements or bills. 
THE COURT: When you inputted on a that's how this whole testimony got started. He 
asked you , did your husband at the time object to you doing this, putting this stuff in 
Quicken? (emphasis added) 
THE WITNESS: I didn't put it into Quicken. I do\\,'Illoaded it straight from the bank 
statements online. 
THE COURT: Okay 
THE WITNESS: I do\\,'Illoaded everything from out bank statements and credit card 
statements. 
THE COURT: So, that's the information you do\\,'Illoaded it from? 
THE WITNESS: Yes,. Right from online-
THE COURT: Okay 
(Tr., p.75, L.24 0 p.76, L.15.) 
THE COURT: And how did you get the -
THE WITNESS: -directly-
THE COURT: - information into the Quicken? 
THE WITNESS: I do\\,'Illoaded it off the Internet from our bank statements. (Tr. p.84, 
Ls.19-23.) 
41. After do\\,'Illoading the financial transactions into Quicken Stacy assigned each record a 
category. 
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THE COURT: But you had to make that decision, what was, went to where? Right? 
WITNESS: I did have to make the decisions of the categories. (Tr., p.76, Ls. 17-22.) 
42. Exhibits 11, 11-A, and 35 are reports by Category of expense. 11 and 11-A are in the 
Record. Exhibit 35 was not properly preserved for appeal, however Stacy read from Exhibit 
35 at trial, listing Categories. (Tr. p. 64 - p. 68.). 
43. Exhibits 11, 11-A, and 35 are downloaded out of Quicken. 
Q. MR BEVIS: Now turn to Exhibit 35 ... What is that? 
A. This is called Spending During the Marriage, 2006 through 2009. This is a document 
that was downloaded out of Quicken, and its our expenditures, Marks and my 
expenditures from 2006 through 2009. (Tr., p. 64, Ls.2-8.) 
MR. BEVIS: Handing you what's been marked for identification as Exhibits 11 and 11-
A, produced from your answers to discovery to Counsel on October 14, 2013. What is 
Exhibit 11 and what is Exhibit 11-A. 
A: Exhibit 11 is Spending on Children During the Marriage, 2006 Through 2009, downloaded 
from Quicken. 11-A is 2006 through 2009 Spending During Marriage, downloaded from 
Quicken .. (Tr. p. 95, L 23 - p.96, L. 25.) 
44. The Magistrate did not allow Stacy to explain how the exhibits were created from the 
Quicken records. (Tr. p. 73, Ls. 11-23.) 
45. Mark's counsel was made aware that there were Quicken records that supported Exhibits 11 
and 11-A at the deposition November 14, 2013, and they were not requested after the 
deposition: 
MR. BEVIS: Judge these (Exhibits 11 and 11-A) were produced on October 14, 2013. 
So he's had plenty of opportunity to request these back-up documents. That further, 
in that regard, at his - at her deposition she was asked about those. She clearly 
revealed in her deposition on November 14, 2013, that there were Quicken records 
that supported Exhibits 11 and 11-A. And as a result they have been made 
available. They haven't requested them .. (Tr., p. 96, L.198-p. 97, L.. 7.) 
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Q. BY MR. BEVIS: At the deposition, Stacy, were you asked by Mr. Welsh about 
Quicken? 
A. I was asked about -
MR. WELSH: Judge, I'm going to object 
THE WITNESS: - Quicken 
MR. WELSH: - irrelevant whether I did or didn't ask her the question. It's not 
relevant. 
Q. BY MR. BEVIS : And did he - at that point in time, did he -
THE COURT: No. 
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: - did he ask to see the-
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection.(Tr. p. 77, L. 16 -p. 78, L. 3.) 
Mr. Bevis: Have you personally made a request to look at the Quicken records that she 
mentioned in her deposition that day? 
A: Have I personally? No. 
Mr. Bevis: Did you ask your counsel to? 
A: No.(Tr.,p.130,L16-p.131,L.19.) 
46. Quicken is a computer program. (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 5-11.) Computer programs store data 
records electronically. 
47. Stacy did not give Mark the paper bank statements from 2006 through 2009 prior to trial. No 
one asked her to (Tr. p. 76, L. 21-25.) 
48. The district court at the appeal hearing stated that those bank statements are community 
property and Mark had as equal access to them as Stacy. (Appeal Tr. p. 32, L. 25, p. 32, 
L.19.) 
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49. Stacy had the bank statements at home. The Magistrate ruled that the bank statements could 
not be brought over at the noon hour. (Tr. p. 85, Ls. 1-21.) 
50. Exhibit 35, whose underlying records were Quicken, was provided two days before trial after 
Mr. Welsh cancelled a meeting set for the day before. (Tr. p. 97 ., Ls. 1-23.) 
51. The Magistrate ruled Exhibits 11, 11-A, and 35 inadmissible because Stacy did not provide 
the bank statements prior to trial pursuant to IRE 1006. (p. 100, L. 17 - p. 101, L.11.) 
52. Trial court ruled that Exhibits 11, 11-A, and 35 were inadmissible because Stacy is not an 
expert in Quicken. (p. 100, L. 17 - p. 101, L.11.) 
53. Stacy used Quicken from 2006 through 2009 to balance the checkbook, and Mark was aware 
that she used Quicken, and Mark paid the bills. (Tr., p. 64, Ls. 4-23) 
54. Stacy had been operating Quicken prior to 2006, she used to do Mark's Quickbooks for his 
business, and she has been doing this type of work for 14 years or longer. (Tr., p. 99, Ls.17-
22.) 
55. Stacy worked for a financial management firm and was a computer programmer there, and 
Quicken is a computer program. (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 5-11.) 
56. Stacy operated Quicken appropriately and accurately to produce Exhibits 11 and 11-A, and 
35 .. (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 12-16.) 
57. Stacy prepared Exhibit 35 specifically for the trial because Exhibits 11 and 11-A are hard to 
read. (Tr. p. 83, Ls.3-16.) If you look at them you will see that the categories are 
alphabetical. Stacy was asked to explain the relationship between 35, 11, and 11-A but the 
Magistrate said no. Id. 
58. Exhibit 35 broke out what were Family expenses versus what were children only expenses. 
(R. p. 000236.) 
59. Neither attorney indicated any current budgets were to be introduced. (CORR Tr, pp.1- 21.) 
60. The trial court was made aware that this was a high income case. 
MR: WELSH: they did a deal that had alimony and a real low child support. So there's no 
question child support needs to be set. And if we can't get it done the issues going to be 
what amount above the $300,000 that you decide, if any, that you want to set. I hate to 
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use the C word for fear that the Appellate Court may read this record. I won't use the C 
word in this transcript, Your Honor, as they thought you did in Jensen. 
THE COURT: No, no I you know that's yeah. I will never let that word pass my lips-
ever again. (Corr. Pre Trial Tr., p.6, L.21 -p. 7, L.25.) 
61. This Magistrate ruled on the Jensen case, a case of budgets and high incomes, finding that the 
children's standard of living during the marriage was about the same as the children's current 
standard ofliving. Jensen v. Jensen, 917 P.2d 760, 128 Idaho 600 (1996). The evidence from 
this case was destroyed in 2000 (Ada County Clerk's Office) 
62. The Magistrate made no indication that he needed any evidence of current budgets to 
appropriately decide this case. (CORR Tr, pp.I- 21.) 
63. The Magistrate stated about Stacy's attorney at trial: "But you keep doing the same things 
that you have always done, that you think you control everything here.: (Tr. p. 86, L.10-13.) 
64. need to be an expert to operate it: 
65. The Magistrate directed Mark's attorney to draft the Modification Judgment. There are no 
child support calculation attachments included. (R. 000201-000204.) 
66. Exhibit F is the child support calculation of $1,726 which is the amount of the Judgment 
Modification prepared by Mark's attorney. It has Stacy receiving one tax exemption and 
Mark receiving the other. However, the Magistrate ordered both exemptions to Stacy. 
67. The Magistrate correctly calculated the pro-rata percentage to be 94% Mark and 6% Stacy 
based on $550,000 and $38,000 of income. (R. - 000198.) 
68. In the opening of his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the Magistrate stated "factual 
issues about which there was conflicting testimony or evidence were resolved by determining 
the evidence that was the most credible." (R. -000185) 
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District Appeal 
69. At the appeal hearing the district judge stated, "I had a hard time finding any place where 
there appeared to be any significant impeachment of either party. They both seemed to 
testify pretty straightforward." (Appeal Tr., p. 29, Ls. 20-25.) 
70. At the appeal hearing, the district Judge asked about the word voracity and Mark's attorney 
stated he thought it was a typo and in context it should have been veracity. (Appeal Tr., p. 29, 
Ls. 4-19.)4 
71. Appeal Hearing, The Magistrate committed error improperly barred Stacy from requesting 
the right to make an offer of proof on Exhibit 35. (R. pp. 363,364.) 
72. Appeal Hearing: MR. BEVIS: Stacy -- also, the judge backfilled, Stacy is not expert at 
Quicken. I'll tell you, under the state of this record, she's clearly an expert in posting 
Quicken. And that finding volunteered to support the ruling is unsupported, as well. 
THE COURT: Well, I was kind of curious. Even I can work Quicken, and do work it. What 
would differentiate an expert from anybody else plugging in the information that they 
received? (R. p. 364.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The District Court Erred in Affirming: that the Magistrate Did Not Commit Error Barring 
Evidence Per Rule 1006 And That The Exclusion Of Evidence Under The New I.R.F.L.P 
Rule 102 .. B.2 Was Correct 
2. The District Court Erred In Affirming The Child Support Amount Awarded By The 
Magistrate Was Based On Substantial Evidence 
4AII citations to "Appeal Tr." in this brief refer to the43-page Appeal Transcript which includes the 
transcript of the July 29, 2015 heard before Honorable Gerald Schroeder in the district court .. 
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3. The District Court Erred In Affirming That Stacy's Lack Of Veracity Was Unimportant 
To The Magistrate's Decision 
4. The District Court Erred In Affirming That The Tax Exemptions Should Be Assigned To 
Stacy When They Are Of Zero Benefit to Mark 
5. The District Court Erred By Not Awarding Attorney's Fees To Stacy Pursuant to LC.§ 
32-704, LC §32-705, LC §12-121 and Section XIII Of The MOU Attached To The 
Decree (Exhibit 28) 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred in Affirming: that the Magistrate Did Not Commit Error 
Barring Evidence Per Rule 1006 And That The Exclusion Of Evidence Under The 
New I.R.F.L.P Rule 102 .. B.2 Was Correct 
The pre-trial conference is the time and place for a Judge to ask for exactly what he needs 
in order to make a fair determination of child support pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d), so as to prevent 
undue waste of time at trial and excessive trial expense. This pre trial conference was March 24, 
2014. EDMUNDS v. KRANER•I42 Idaho 867, 877 (Idaho 2006) speaks about the importance 
of the pre trial conferences and also about securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding pursuant to I.R.C.P. l(a): 
Our rules of civil procedure and the express purposes behind our discovery rules likewise 
recognize the court's authority to limit the number of expert witnesses. Rule 16( d)( 4) 
provides that a court may limit the number of expert witnesses prior to trial. Rule l(a) 
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requires that the rules of civil procedure "be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." Our 
discovery rules were designed to prevent surprise at trial, Pearce v. Ollie, 121 Idaho 
539, 552, 826 P.2d 888, 901 (1992), and discovery rules regarding expert witnesses were 
designed to promote fairness and candor, see Radmer, 120 Idaho at 89, 813 P.2d at 900. 
Effective cross-examination and rebuttal of expert witnesses requires advanced 
preparation and knowledge of that expert's testimony. Id Neither effective cross-
examination nor effective discovery designed to achieve "just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action" can take place when one party is allowed to disclose an 
oppressive number of expert witnesses and the trial court refuses to consider limiting 
expert testimony. St. Alphonsus's statement that they really only disclosed three expert 
witnesses should not have come at the appellate level, but should have been dealt with at 
an early pretrial conference. 
At the very least the trial court should have considered the Edmunds' request to limit the 
number of experts as a discovery issue and examined the purposes behind our discovery 
rules when ruling on the motion. Ideally, the lower court should have held a 
conference pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d) to discuss limiting the number of experts and 
determine more fully on which issues these experts would be expected to testify in order 
to comport with the purposes behind expert witness discovery and to prevent possible 
discovery abuses. Idaho trial courts are expected to effectively and actively manage 
discovery to achieve the purposes of the discovery rules and to reach a "just, speedy, 
and inexpensive" determination of the issues. Therefore, this Court reverses the district 
court's denial of the Edmunds motion to limit the number of expert witnesses and 
remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. (Bold emphasis added) 
Stacy's attorney's fees for this case were so high that she could no longer afford to retain Mr. 
Bevis for this appeal, and has been forced to argue this case pro se. 
Neither attorney stated any plan to present any current budget/obligations/needs figures in 
the pre-trial memos nor at the pre-trial conference. 
Mark's post trial memo says that he has not and will not argue that it is Stacy's burden to 
prove the factors contained in Paragraph 126(1)(4). But case law states that these are 
evidence driven factors. (R. - 000178) 
Stacy's pre-trial memorandum stated that she will present evidence including Mark's 
resources, the standard of living the children enjoyed during the marriage, the physical 
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and emotion needs of the children including their education, and the special talents and 
abilities of the children and the cost of education or training those abilities. (R., p.125.) 
The Magistrate did not ask either attorney to provide any kind of current budget at the pre-trial 
conference. The Magistrate was very specific at pre-trial as to the only evidence he wanted to 
see: 
THE COURT: Well I'm only worried about the budget during the marriage, 
how much of the child's expenses during the marriage, 
what they're used to during the marriage. (CORR.Tr., p. 16, Ls. 4-15; R., p.351.) 
Therefore, Stacy presented substantial evidence at trial of standard of living during the 
marriage. The substantial evidence presented came from Quicken Records in the form of 
Exhibits 35, 11, and 11-A. All three exhibits were barred from evidence. There was a sustained 
objection that the originals (physical bank statements) had not been made available prior to trial 
pursuant to I.R.E. 1006 and there was a sustained objection that Stacy is not an Expert in 
Quicken. (Tr., p. 100, L. 17 p. 101, L.11.) Paramount to this case is that the Magistrate did not 
allow Stacy to explain how the exhibits were created from the Quicken records. (Tr. p. 73, Ls. 
11-23.) The Magistrate simply did not want to hear this critical evidence. Carr v. Edgar, 2014 
Opinion No. 103 (September 26, 2014). 
Exhibits 11, 11-A, and 35 were produced out of Quicken and were reports by Category. 
Exhibits 11 and 11-A are in the Record. Exhibit 35 was not properly preserved for appeal, 
however Stacy read from Exhibit 35 at trial, listing Categories. (Tr. p. 64 - p. 68.). 
THE COURT: But you had to make that decision, what was, went to where? Right? 
WITNESS: I did have to make the decisions of the categories. (Tr., p.76, Ls. 17-22.) 
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Stacy assigned the a category to each bank transaction. 
In the case of IN RE NWFX, INC.,267 B.R. 118, 179 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2001), 
Bird also testified that they discovered an overpayment in state bond fees. In June of 
1992, a check was written for $41,600.00, and it was coded in the Quicken Records 
category as "Legal Fees," which was in error.42 This check was in payment of state bond 
fees and not subject to Court order. Also, on October 29, 1992, a check was \\<Titten for 
$141,527.00, of which $41,527.00 was in payment of state bond fees. $100,000.00 of 
that check was recorded in the Quicken Records under the category "Trustee's 
Fees." 43 The remaining $41,527.00 was recorded under the category "Trustee's Bond" in 
error. Bird testified that, "Apparently in retrospect, looking back at it, it appears I simply 
didn't realize that the didn't remember that the forty-one, six had already been paid and 
I don't recall calling and asking, you know, has this been done. But in looking back at it I 
now realize that that was categorized for whatever reason as legal fees." 
42
Check number 2707 payable to the Rose Law Firm in the amount of $41,600.00 and dated 
June 15, 1992. 
In this case, a check was written and is coded in the Quicken Records under a Category, 
"Trustee's Fees". The footnote shows the original check information, the dollar amount and the 
payee, Rose Law Firm. 
IN RE NWFX, INC., 267 B.R. 118, 196 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2001), illustrates an 
example of how Quicken can be used to easily dive down into a particular Category of expenses: 
All Bird had to do before, or at the time of, preparing his June 25, 1992, motion was to 
pull up the Quicken records, category "Trustee's Fees," to see the following entries: 
Date: 2/2/89 Acct: NWF Num: 1589 Description: Allen W. Bird II Category: Trustee's 
Fee Amount: $38,000.00 
Date 1/29/90 Acct: NWF Num: 2004 Description: Allen W. Bird II Category: Trustee's 
Fee Amount: $50,000.00. 
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Here there are two transactions associated with the category "Trustee's Fees", which look just 
like bank statement transactions. It is clear from these two examples that when dealing with 
Quicken categories one needs to know what category was assigned to each banking transaction if 
one wants to prove or disprove a Quicken report by Category. It is also clear if one looks at 
Exhibits 11 and 11-A that this is true. The figures on that report are grouped by the Category. 
So in order to authentic the evidence that Stacy presented one must have access to the original 
Quicken records which are stored solely with the Quicken software program itself 
Regarding the bank transactions it is important to note that Stacy downloaded the bank 
and credit card transactions from the Internet. She did not manually input that information into 
Quicken from physical bank statements. 
THE COURT: When you inputted on a that's how this whole testimony got started. He 
asked you, did your husband at the time object to you doing this, putting this stuff in 
Quicken? (emphasis added) 
THE WITNESS: I didn't put it into Quicken. I downloaded it straight from the bank 
statements online. 
THE COURT: Okay 
THE WITNESS: I downloaded everything from out bank statements and credit card 
statements. 
THE COURT: So, that's the information you downloaded it from? 
THE WITNESS: Yes,. Right from online-
THE COURT: Okay 
(Tr., p.75, L.24 0 p.76, L.15.) 
THE COURT: And how did you get the -
THE WITNESS: -directly-
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THE COURT: - information into the Quicken? 
THE WITNESS: I downloaded it off the Internet from our bank statements. (Tr. p.84, 
Ls.19-23.) 
The Quicken records themselves were made available to Mark and his counsel at the 
deposition, November 14, 2013, but they never requested them. Quicken was used to produce all 
three Exhibits 11, 11-A and 35. 
Q. MR BEVIS: Now turn to Exhibit 35 ... What is that? 
A. This is called Spending During the Marriage, 2006 through 2009. This is a document 
that was downloaded out of Quicken, and it's our expenditures, Marks and my 
expenditures from 2006 through 2009. (Tr., p. 64, Ls.2-8.) 
MR. BEVIS: Handing you what's been marked for identification as Exhibits 11 and 11-
A, produced from your answers to discovery to Counsel on October 14, 2013. What is 
Exhibit 11 and what is Exhibit 11-A. 
A: Exhibit 11 is Spending on Children During the Marriage, 2006 Through 2009, 
downloaded from Quicken. 11-A is 2006 through 2009 Spending During Marriage, 
downloaded from Quicken .. (Tr. p. 95, L 23 - p.96, L. 25.) 
Quicken is a computer program. (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 5-11.) Mark asked Stacy to comply with 
I.R.C.P 34 in the request for production. (R. - 0000 87.) Stacy produced Exhibits 11 and 11-A 
for discovery. 
MR. BEVIS: Judge these (Exhibits 11 and 11-A) were produced on October 14, 2013. 
So he's had plenty of opportunity to request these back-up documents. That further, in 
that regard, at his - at her deposition she was asked about those. She clearly revealed in 
her deposition on November 14, 2013, that there were Quicken records that supported 
Exhibits 11 and 11-A. And as a result they have been made available. They haven't 
requested them. . (Tr., p. 96, L.198 - p. 97, L ... 7.) 
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It was Mark who had to specifically request production of Quicken, an electronic storage device, 
pursuant to The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule ("LR. C.P. ") 34(b): 
Production of Documents, Electronically Stored Information, Things, and Entry Upon 
Land for Inspection and Other Purposes - the Procedure 
(1) The request may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after 
commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the 
summons and complaint upon that party. The request shall set forth the items to be 
inspected either by individual item or by category, and describe each item and category 
with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and 
manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts. To obtain discovery of 
data or information that exists in electronic or data storage devices in any medium, the 
requesting party must specifically request production of such data and specify the form 
or manner of delivery in which the requesting party wants it produced. (Emphasis added) 
Stacy was only compelled to produce documents and Quicken was not specifically requested in 
the first request for production. (R. 000087-000089) Quicken is not a document. The Record 
shows that there was no notice filed with the court for any supplemental production of Quicken 
after the deposition and prior to trial. (R.,-000003) 
In the case before this Court there was a formal request for production in the record stipulating 
that Stacy must comply with I.R.C.P. 34(b). ERNST v. HEMENWAY AND MOSER, CO., 
INC, 120 Idaho 948 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991), states: 
No formal request for production of the documents appears in the record. However, there 
is an indication that Mr. Powers was served with a subpoena duces tecum for a second 
deposition but he refused to appear at the deposition or to produce the requested 
documents. The court heard arguments and granted the motion to compel. H M moved 
the court to reconsider its order. The court refused, but stated that no motion to compel 
discovery had been necessary for production of documents because the Emsts never 
requested the materials pursuant to I.R.C.P. 34 "or otherwise." 
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In PEACOCK v. MERRILL•CA 05-0377-BH-C., 1 (S.D. Ala. Jan 17, 2008), the 
defendants followed the rules of procedure and properly requested electronic data: 
1. On May 18, 2007, the Merrill defendants filed a motion to compel production of 
plaintiffs most recent tax returns as well as electronic information, specifically "a full 
and complete inspection of electronic information contained on a certain disk bate-stamp 
number 'Peacock 20441"' and "'Disk #2.' 
Stacy and her counsel followed I.R.C.P. 34(b). Mark and his counsel did not. Mark's counsel 
did ask Stacy about Quicken at the deposition. 
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: At the deposition, Stacy, were you asked by Mr. Welsh about 
Quicken? 
A. I was asked about -
MR. WELSH: Judge, I'm going to object 
THE WITNESS: - Quicken 
MR. WELSH: - irrelevant whether I did or didn't ask her the question. It's not 
relevant. 
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: And did he- at that point in time, did he-
THE COURT: No. 
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: - did he ask to see the -
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. (Tr. p. 77, L. 16 -p. 78, L. 3.) 
Clearly the question is relevant to this case. Stacy's attorney is about to ask Stacy ifhe asked to 
see the Quicken records, another relevant question. Mr. Welsh was supposed to follow I.R.C.P. 
34, and the next question would have revealed that he did not. But the Magistrate wouldn't hear 
anything of relevance, again much like Carr. 
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Notably, in another recent case, Mr. Welsh represented Monica Garner throughout her 
divorce proceeding, and he didn't follow the proper procedure in that case either, resulting in an 
unjust result for those children, which ultimately drove that case in front of this Court as well. 
Garner v. Garner, #41898, 2015 Opinion No. 72, July 22, 2015. 
Having refused the opportunity to examine the Quicken records for Exhibits 11, 11-A, 
and Exhibit 35, the objection at trial was improper and untimely. Lattimore v.Citibank, F.S.B., 
979 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Exhibits 11 and 11-A were produced back in October of 
2013, Exhibit 35, was provided two days before trial after Mr. Welsh cancelled a meeting set for 
the day before. (Tr. p. 97., Ls. 1-23.) Quicken was made available 143 days earlier, counsel for 
Mark could not claim surprise (Stich v. U.S., 730 F.2d 115 (3rd Cir. Ct. App. 1984)), (R. -
000248) State v. Barlow, 113 Idaho 573 (Ct. App. 1987), was clarified by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 57 (2002), that the party offering the summary must make 
the summarized documents reasonably available to the opposing party, which was done here, 
143 days before trial which is not rebutted in this record. (R. - 000247.) 
Stacy used Quicken from 2006 through 2009 to balance the checkbook, and Mark was 
aware that she used Quicken, and Mark paid the bills. (Tr., p. 64, Ls. 4-23) Stacy had been 
operating Quicken prior to 2006, she used to do Mark's QuickBooks for his business, and she 
has been doing this type of work for 14 years or longer. (Tr., p. 99, Ls.17-22.) Stacy worked for 
a financial management firm and was a computer programmer there, and Quicken is a computer 
program. (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 5-11.) Stacy operated Quicken appropriately and accurately to 
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produce Exhibits 11 and 11-A, and 35 ... (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 12-16.) There were no objections at 
trial to any of this testimony. Appellant's Reply Brief (R. - 000321.) states, "Mark's counsel 
chose not to request the Quicken records earlier and to object to them tacitly at trial because they 
were so probative. Stich v. U.S., 730 F.2d 115 (3rct Cir. Ct. App. 1984). His tactical objection 
was too late. Sumitomo Bank of California v. Product Promotions, Inc., 717 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 
Ct. App. 1983); Lattimore v. Citibank, F.S.B., 979 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Stich v.U.S., 
730 F.2d 115 (3rct Cir. Ct. ArP· 1984) 
This case was heard under the new Idaho Rules of Family Procedure which includes a 
brand new rule of evidence, Rule 102, intended to allow for a more relaxed standard of evidence 
for family law cases. According to the Idaho Supreme Court website: 
Rule 102.B is designed to be simpler and easier to apply than the more formal and 
technical rules in the IRE which often operate to restrict the admission of relevant 
evidence. The less formal new rule should facilitate the presentation of relevant evidence 
at trial for all parties http://www.isc.idaho.gov/rules/irflp/IRFLP FA Os 4-14.pdf. 
Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure Rule 102. Applicability of Other Rules. 
A. Applicability of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
apply only when incorporated by reference in these rules. Appeals from family law cases 
shall be governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
B. Applicability of Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
1. Upon notice to the court filed by any party within thirty (30) days after a response or 
other responsive pleading is filed, or, if none, within forty-two (42) days from the filing 
of the motion or petition, or such other date as may be established by the court, any party 
may require strict compliance with the Idaho Rules of Evidence, except as provided in 
Rule 102.B.3. 
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2. If no such notice is filed, all relevant evidence is admissible, provided, however, that 
the court shall exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, lack of reliability or failure to 
adequately and timely disclose same. This admissibility standard shall replace rules 403, 
602, 801-806, 901-903 and 1002-1005, Idaho Rules of Evidence, except as provided in 
Rule 102.B.3. (Emphasis added) 
All remaining provisions of the Idaho Rules of Evidence apply. 3. Regardless of whether 
a notice is filed under Rule 102.B.1, records of regularly conducted activity as defined in 
Rule 803(6), Idaho Rules of Evidence, may be admitted into evidence without testimony 
of a custodian or other qualified witness as to its authenticity if such document (i) appears 
complete and accurate on its face, (ii) appears to be relevant and reliable, and (iii) is 
seasonably disclosed and copies are provided at time of disclosure to all other parties. 
The Honorable Schroeder and Mr. Bevis spoke about I.R.E. 1006 and this new Rule 102 
at the appeal hearing: 
THE COURT: You touched on an issue that I had in my head, also, is whether 1006 
should be interpreted any differently when an exhibit involves child support or involves, say, 
spousal support or division of property. Is there a difference, or is it the same regardless of what 
records and for what purpose are they being offered? 
MR. BEVIS: I don't think there is any difference. I thought the question would come, 
because 1006 is kind of carved out a little differently than the rest. But even the 1006 rule is 
subject to the rule that permits the reliable evidence and probative value to come in. The real 
reason of this change - both of these lawyers were on that same committee --was to get that 
probative evidence in front of the Court so it can make a proper decision; not to do what this 
judge did, exclude the evidence that he apparently did not want to hear. If he hadn't ruled so 
quick, he might have been willing to do this. (Appeal Tr., pp. 23 - 24.) 
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The record shows that Stacy established the indicia of reliability for Quicken records used 
to produce Exhibits 11, 11-A, and 35 pursuant to I.R.F.L.P., Rule 102.B.2 and Rule 102.B.3. 
The Appellant's brief states at (R. -000248): 
· Here, I.R.F.L.P. Rule 102.B.3, like the business records exception, I.R.E., 803(6) permits 
their introduction apart from I.R.E., Rule 1006. Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53 (2002). 
Under Rule 102.B.2., I.R.F.L.P., Exhibit 35 was relevant admissible evidence. The 
probative value was not outweighed by confusion of issues, since the evidence is what 
the Magistrate wanted. Mark's attorney knew at the Pre-Trial Conference that Magistrate 
McDaniel wanted the evidence of the children's expenses. 12 
12 Magistrate McDaniel misspoke that he was only interested in the child's income, but 
Mr. Welsh corrected him that he was only interested in the children's expenses during the 
marriage, and Magistrate McDaniel followed counsel's correction. 
The Appellant's brief at (R. -000244): 
Per State v. Barlow, supra, I.R.E., 1006 requires that the originals or duplicates, should be 
made available at a reasonable time and place which included making them available at 
court9 
9 The objection was made by opposing counsel under I.R.E., 1006 and sustained but 
I.R.F .L.P ., 102.B.2 and 3 controlled the issue and the exhibit should have been admitted. 
Counsel for Mark did not file within 42 days of the filing of the Petition a Notice 
insisting upon strict compliance with the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Rule 102.B.l, 
I.R.F.L.P .. 
The Appellant's brief is correct. I.R.F .L.P ., 102.B.2 and 3 controlled the issue despite the fact 
that I.R.E. 1006 is not replaced in I.R.F.L.P 102.B.2: 
This admissibility standard shall replace rules 403,602, 801-806, 901-903 and 1002-
1005, Idaho Rules of Evidence, except as provided in Rule 102.B.3. (Emphasis added) 
The filing for strict compliance is irrelevant for I.R.F.L.P 102.B.3: 
Regardless of whether a notice is filed under Rule 102.B.1, (emphasis added) records of 
regularly conducted activity as defined in Rule 803(6), Idaho Rules of Evidence, may be 
admitted into evidence without testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness as to 
24 
its authenticity if such document (i) appears complete and accurate on its face, (ii) 
appears to be relevant and reliable, and (iii) is seasonably disclosed and copies are 
provided at time of disclosure to all other parties. 
The Magistrate Court violated Rule 102.B.2, I.R.F .L.P. in not admitting Exhibits 11, 11-A, and 
3 5. The Court committed an error of law by not accepting the uncontradicted testimony of a 
witness regarding the Quicken records used to produce Exhibits 35, 11, 11-A. Reed v. Reed, 
supra. (R - 000268) 
The District Court opinion gave no concern to I.R.F .L.P. 102.B other than properly 
noting that a timely notice requesting strict compliance with the Idaho Rules of Evidence is not 
applicable to I.R.E. 1006 under that rule. (R. -000364). There is not one reference to I.R.F .L.P. 
Rule 102.B.2 or 102.B.3 in the Magistrate's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. "The trial 
court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its judgment will be reversed on 
appeal only when there has been an abuse of discretion." State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 34 (1997) 
It seems abuse of discretion to simply ignore the new rule of evidence for all family law cases 
when this is a family law case. Despite the substantial and competent evidence in the record the 
District Court had no opinion on I.F .R.L.P. Rule 102.B.2, 102.B.3 either. There is no case law 
on this rules yet. 
The District Court Erred In Affirming The Child Support Amount Awarded By The 
Magistrate Was Based On Substantial Evidence 
A key point is that this was not a typical child support modification case. Stacy did not 
file the motion because Mark's income had increased since the divorce. She filed the motion 
25 
because alimony had ended and child support had been set artificially low while Mark was 
paying alimony. (Tr. p. 4, Ls. 4-11.) 
As in Garner, .this case also deals with a stipulated agreement. But in this case both 
Stacy and Mark stipulated that the low child support figure at the time of the divorce would be 
automatically reviewed when spousal support ended. Mark's own attorney was the one to note 
this agreement at pre-trial conference: 
MR: WELSH: they did a deal that had alimony and a real low child support. So there's 
no question child support needs to be set. (Corr. Pre Trial Tr., p.6, Ls.21 -25.) 
A motion to modify child support must state a substantial and material change in the moving 
party's circumstances since the last order affecting support obligations. Kornfield v. Kornfield, 
134 Idaho 383, 385, 3 P.3d 61, 63 (Ct. App. 2000). It is clear that this case was about truing up 
the low child support originally ordered because alimony was used in lieu of child support so that 
Mark could write it off on his taxes. (Tr. p. 45, Ls. 4-11.) 
Expenses in the chart below are from Exhibit 11, Spending on Children During the Marriage, 
2006-2009. The $1,726 at $300,000 of combined income is Exhibit F. Notably, Mark's income 
at the time of the divorce and the prior year was right at $300,000. So the spending during the 
marriage is based on the top end of the child support calculation. If Exhibit 11 had been entered 
into evidence a deviation from the child support calculation would have needed to have been 
written up by the court. Stacy would be using Exhibit 35 in this chart but it was not properly 
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preserved for appeal. Both exhibits are the underlying same Quicken records from 2006 through 
2009. 
Spending on the Children During the Marriage 2006-2009 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Income 223,873 252,150 297,960 305,012 
Expenses 146,089 157,402 162,349 145,012 
Difrerence 77,784 94,748 135,611 160,000 
Monthly Expenses $ 12,174 $ 13,117 $ 13,529 $ 12,084 
Child Support Ordered: $1,726@ exactly $300,000 ofcombined income 
Mark's income for 2006 was $223,873, in 2007 was $252,150, and in 2008 was $297,960. (Tr. p. 
41, L. 17 -p. 42, L. 3.). The record shows 2009 income as twice Stacy's 2009 tax return, so 
$305,012. Plus the Affidavit oflncome at time of divorce showed $300,000. (R. -000027.) 
Q. And - and 2009, the same question; line 22, 5 it shows his income at what? 
A. 2009, this is actually my tax return. 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. I - we filed separately because that was the 9 year we got divorced. So -
Q. Okay. 
A. - my income for 2009 was 152,506. 
Q. Now, you weren't working in 2009; correct? 
A. No. This was based on --
Q. So, you had to split the income? 
A. Right. We basically split his income for the year. 
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Q. So, his income was approximately twice 18 152,506? 
A. I believe that would be true. It was 20 probably a little bit more because we divorced 
on December 15th -
Q. All right. (Tr. p. 42, Ls4-22.) 
In the recent Gamer opinion this Court is very clear on the judge's role in determining a 
just and appropriate child support amount: 
The reason for the child support statute, and the Guidelines it authorizes, is to make sure 
judges are making decisions in the children's best interests. Those Guidelines are not 
merely suggestions. (Emphasis added) Rather, the legislature has enacted a mandatory, 
rebuttable presumption that the amount of child support in the Guidelines is the correct 
amount of support. That statute plainly provides: 
There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of the award which 
would result from the application of the guidelines is the amount of child support 
to be awarded, unless evidence ( emphasis added) is presented in a particular case 
which indicates that an application of the guidelines would be unjust or 
inappropriate. If the court determines that circumstances exist to permit a 
departure from the guidelines, the judge making the determination shall make a 
written or specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines 
would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case before the court. 
LC. § 32-706(5). These requirements are set forth in the Guidelines as well. The amount 
of support indicated in the Guidelines "is the amount of child support to be awarded 
unless evidence ( emphasis added) establishes that amount to be inappropriate. In such 
case the court shall set forth on the record the dollar amount of support that the 
Guidelines would require and set forth the circumstances justifying departure from the 
Guidelines .... " I.C.S.G. § 3. The statute also states clearly that there "shall be a 
rebuttable presumption that a minimum amount of support is at least $50.00 per month 
per child," LC. § 32-706(5), and the Guidelines explain, "[r]arely should the child support 
obligation be set at zero." I.C.S.G. § 4(d). 
The rules are quite clear that in all cases, the child support awarded must be the amount 
stated in the Guidelines unless some evidence ( emphasis added) justifies a deviation. It is 
the judge's duty to explain the reason for any deviation. There is no exception in the rules 
or the statute for agreements between the parties; the Guidelines apply "in all judicial 
proceedings that address the issue of child support .... " Id at § 2. 7 
Garner v. Garner, #41898, 2015 Opinion No. 72, July 22, 2015, pp.6,7. 
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Stacy asks this Court to consider its decision on Gamer in terms of this case. The ruling 
on this came down just seven days prior to the appeal hearing, July 29, 2015. The two cases 
were like ships passing in the night which is why there is no mention of Garner at district appeal. 
Neither the Magistrate nor the district court made any effort to protect the children's best 
interests. The basic tenet of the income shares model is the child support be awarded as if the 
parent's marriage had remained intact. These children were  into a very high standard of 
living marriage. Kate was  in nd Mark's income was over half a million dollars. 
(Exhibit 10) Matt was  in the year the family had net proceeds of over $600,000 from 
the sale of their home on which to live. (Exhibit 12) Mark's 2010 income was $399,834 
(Exhibit 6) Mark's 2011 income was: $434,429 (Exhibit 7) Mark's 2012 income $471,034 (Tr. 
p. 39, L. 22 p. 40., L. 3.) Mark's 2013 income was $550,000. (Tr., p.23, Ls. 12-22.) He 
received a substantial salary increase from $15,625 to $18,750 every pay period beginning 
January 1, 2014. (Tr. p. 108, Ls. 10-17.) 
Stacy never suggested that child support amounts should even be close to the amounts 
that she and Mark were spending during the marriage on the children. Her Petition to Modify 
states $2,537 at Mark's $440,000 income. Subsequent proposals that are in this record for 
illustrative purposes only show when income increases over the $300,000 and the last 8% is 
carried forward in the child support calculation , the child support calculation are still much, 
much lower than what the Gustafson family expenditures were at $300,000 of income. 
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Mark Stacy Child Support 
470,170 38,000 2,727 Exhibit 24C 
550,247 38,000 3,270 Exhibit 37 
It is important to note that at $550,000 of income support is still only $3,270 per month and 
Stacy and Mark were spending over $12,000 per month at $250,000- $300,000 of income. 
Perhaps 8% of combined income is not appropriate in cases of high income. In Keller, the 
Supreme Court held that the Magistrate did not err in ordering Jeffrey to pay a percentage of 
income over a given amount per month. The Magistrate had ordered Jeffrey to pay additional 
child support in the amount of 15% of any pre-tax earnings that exceeded $14,000 per month. 
Keller v.Keller, 130 Idaho 661,664 (1997). (R. -000158.). 
In this case had 15% been ordered over $300,000, child support would have been at 
$4,000 per month with Stacy taking both tax exemptions. That is 9% of $550,000 per year. 
During the marriage, Stacy and Mark had two very reasonable cars a Yukon XL and a 
Mazda CX -9 (R. 000048). In the Living Expenses attached to the MOU (R.-000050,000051) 
there were no second homes, no boats, no RVs, no super excessive items in their family 
lifestyle. A key expense is total housing costs which were $4,301 per month. (R 000050), 
composed of the house itself, the utilities, and the upkeep. The Magistrate was well aware of 
these expenses for he was the one that brought it to light in this case in his Facts. These 
expenses are straight from the MOU, attached to the Decree. Magistrate Fact #33 refers to this 
data: (R -000189) 
When the parties entered into the memorandum of understanding that was eventually 
incorporated into their decree of divorce they attached a list of expenses that each would 
30 
share as long as Stacy received maintenance from Mark. This list was entitled "joint 
expense worksheet". 
In the parties memorandum of understanding that was incorporated into their decree 
Mark and Stacy stipulated to expenses that the parties would split while Mark paid 
alimony. 
These expenses were non-discretionary expenses of $89,196.00 ($99,276.00 minus 
Stacy's apartment expenses of $10,080.00) and discretionary expense of $28,450.00 
totaling$117,646.00. This clearly shows the standard ofliving the two children 
experienced during the Marriage. 
Housing costs alone were $4,301 per month, during the Marriage, and yet the Magistrate 
stated in his conclusion that, "This analysis coupled with Mark's accepted offer to pay all 
medical, dental and vision insurance and all uncovered medical, dental and vision expenses 
would leave this court to the conclusion that the presumed correct child support of $1,731.53 is 
the correct child support to be paid." (R. 000198). 
The pro-rata percentage was 94% Mark anyway. (R-000198). Medical Insurance was 
$4,480 per year. (R. -000108). Neither party testified that either child had excessive health 
needs. This is not sound analysis, and is an abuse of discretion. 
The District Court stated that, the Magistrate reviewed the applicable factors in relation to 
the evidence presented. There is no identification of a specific factor tied to an error by the 
magistrate. The magistrate did not abuse his discretion. (R. - 000368) Standard of living during 
the marriage is an applicable factor. $4,301 in housing is a factor. If housing expense is greater 
than total child support ordered that is error. The magistrate had a responsibility to the children 
in this case to determine a just and fair child support given their upbringing. Yet he clearly did 
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not want to see any real evidence of how these kids lived. Neither apparently did the district 
court. 
What is truly fascinating about how the Magistrate arrived at child support is that he said 
he was only interested in the standard of living during the marriage but then he states this: 
Neither party presented any evidence of any current needs and obligations of the 
respective parties. Clearly, this information would be beneficial to the court in 
determining the actual cost of raising the two children and whether or not that cost 
increased, decreased or stayed the same since the last order in December of 2009. 
In the case of Jensen vs. Jensen supra the Supreme Court opined that the magistrate 
correctly first calculated the rebuttable presumed amount of child support in proportion to 
the relative incomes of the parents. Thereafter the Supreme Court stated that the 
Magistrate should analyze the income of the parties and the children's requirement in 
light of the factors set forth in Section lO(c) of the guidelines (Now Rule 126(J)(4)(g)) 
Crucial in the Jensen case as in the case at bar are the present expenses of the parties and 
how it relates to their respective incomes. In the Jensen case the parties presented 
extensive evidence on the parties' present expenses which allowed the court to analyze 
the parties respective resources. However here that is not possible. (R. p.195.) 
He was the Magistrate on the Jensen case. So why would he specifically tell Stacy's attorney 
that he only wants standard of living during the marriage at the pre-trial conference? This is a 
lack of sound discretion. A decision to modify child support is left to the "sound discretion" of 
the trial court. Franks v. Franks, 119 Idaho 997 (Ct. App. 1991); Harris v. Carter, 146 Idaho 22 
(Ct. App. 2008). 
The District Court Erred In Affirming That Stacy's Lack Of Veracity Was 
Unimportant To The Magistrate's Decision 
From the the appeal opinion, the magistrate used the term "Voracity" which appears to 
have been intended to be "veracity," not a form of voracious. The trial court is afforded wide 
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deference in judging the veracity or credibility of witnesses. See Jensen v. Bledsoe, I 00 Idaho 
84, 87, 593 P.2d 988, 91 (1979) (R 000369.) 
In his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the Magistrate stated "factual issues about 
which there was conflicting testimony or evidence were resolved by determining the evidence 
that was the most credible." (R. -000185) At the appeal hearing the district judge stated, "I had a 
hard time finding any place where there appeared to be any significant impeachment of either 
party. They both seemed to testify pretty straightforward." (Appeal Tr., p. 29, Ls. 20-25.) 
The Magistrates Fact #39: 
The tax return that was included for 2009 in Exhibit# 10 was that of Stacy which 
reflected income from wages, salaries and tips of $73,056.00 and income from rental, real 
estate, royalties, partnerships, S-Corporation, trusts, etc., of $77,264.00. So it is virtually 
impossible for this court to piece together the true expenses of the parties at the time of 
the divorce without having both parties' tax calculations. No explanation was ever 
presented to explain Stacy's 2009 tax return and why it was prepared in the way it was 
prepared. (Emphasis added) (R. 000189-000190) 
The Record: 
Q. And - and 2009, the same question; line 22, 5 it shows his income at what? 
A. 2009, this is actually my tax return. 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. I - we filed separately because that was the 9 year we got divorced. So -
Q. Okay. 
A. - my income for 2009 was 152,506. 
Q. Now, you weren't working in 2009; correct? 
A. No. This was based on --
Q. So, you had to split the income? 
A. Right. We basically split his income for the year. 
Q. So, his income was approximately twice 152,506? 
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A. I believe that would be true. It was probably a little bit more because we divorced on 
December 15th -
Q. All right. (Tr. p. 42, Ls. 4-22.) 
The Magistrates Fact #40. 
Stacy in her decree of divorce filed a financial affidavit saying she earned no wages and 
should be imputed $15,080.00 as income for child support purposes. She also indicated in 
the same affidavit that she received $78,000.00 in alimony. However under her decree of 
divorce the alimony was not to begin until 2010 and was calculated at $150,000.00 for 
the first year. (R. 000190) 
The record shows that alimony was at $115,000 for 2010 (see Petitioner's Exhibit #16). Stacy 
read from that Exhibit at trial. (Tr., p. 43, L.20 p. 44, L. 1.) The incorrect $150,000 figure is 
from the MOU, "If Mother chose to go back to work her income plus spousal maintenance could 
not exceed $150,000." (R. - 000039.) Stacy earned no wages for 2009 as stated in the previous 
testimony. Stacy's profession is listed as HOMEMAKER on the 2009 tax return. (Exhibit 10, 
last page). The alimony figure of $78,000 was the best estimate Stacy and Mark could use as 
alimony for 2010 at the time of divorce given the way that alimony was structured for 2010: 
The Father agrees to pay the Mother spousal support for a three year term commencing 
January 1, 2010. The support figure is to be determined as follows: During the calendar 
year of 2010, the parties agree that the Mother shall receive 50% of Father's bi-monthly 
distribution paid upon receipt of distribution (6 payments per year). (R. - 000039.) 
2011 and 2012 had a maximum of $78,000 so that is what Mark and Stacy used for purposes of 
determining child support 
For 2011 and 2012 the specific dollar amounts were also unknown but there was to be a 
maximum of $78,000 each year. (R. -000039.) 
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From these two erroneous statements of fact the Magistrates then concludes under the heading 
Financial resources, needs and obligations of both parents, 
This tax return states that Stacy, contrary to her financial affidavit filed with the decree of 
divorce in December 2009 had income from wages, salaries and tips, etc. of $73,056.00. 
In her financial affidavit, signed and filed December 15, 2009, it was stated that Stacy 
had no income and should only be imputed $15,080.00 per year for salary. 
Also in her 2009 tax return Stacy listed $77,264.00 from rental real estate, royalties, 
partnerships, and S-Corporations, trusts, etc .. This amount is nowhere listed in her 
financial affidavit of December of 2009. 
Also in her financial affidavit of December of 2009 Stacy listed $78,000.00 in alimony 
allegedly received in 2009. However in her 2009 tax return there is listed -0- dollars 
received from alimony. 
Pursuant to the decree of divorce entered into by the parties Stacy was not to begin 
receiving alimony until after January of20IO and then in the amount of $150,000.00 for 
2010, not $78,000.00. 
The $150,000.00 was properly noted on Stacy's 2010 tax return (see Petitioner's Exhibit 
#16). 
All payments under the decree were not to begin until January of20IO. 
These discrepancies place Stacy's voracity in question. (R. 000194-000195) 
The Affidavit oflncome at the time of divorce shows Mark's income of$300,000, which if you 
compare that to Stacy's 2009 tax return and double her income is spot on. Stacy did not list 
$78,000 in alimony on her 2009 tax return because she was married until December 15, 2009. 
There was no alimony for 2009. Alimony like child support started the next month, which just 
happened to be a new year. The Affidavit was signed December 15, 2009 because that was the 
date of divorce. 
The record shows that there is in actuality not a single discrepancy to place Stacy's 
veracity in question. The Magistrates Facts are wrong. By case iaw, "deference" must be given 
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to the "special opportunity" of the trial court to assess and weigh the credibility of the witnesses 
who appear before it. Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho 689 (1990). Magistrate McDaniel recognized he 
had discretion and he then abused it by making up false facts. When Findings of Fact are not 
supported by substantial evidence an abuse of discretion has occurred. Margairez v. Seigel, 137 
Idaho 556 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Notably, right after the Magistrate states that these discrepancies place Stacy's veracity 
(corrected) in question, he states: 
Neither party presented any evidence of any current needs and obligations of the 
respective parties. Clearly, this information would be beneficial to the court in 
determining the actual cost of raising the two children and whether or not that cost 
increased, decreased or stayed the same since the last order in December of 2009. 
In the case of Jensen vs. Jensen supra the Supreme Court opined that the magistrate 
correctly first calculated the rebuttable presumed amount of child support in proportion to 
the relative incomes of the parents. Thereafter the Supreme Court stated that the 
Magistrate should analyze the income of the parties and the children's requirement in 
light of the factors set forth in Section lO(c) of the guidelines (Now Rule 126(J)(4)(g)) 
Crucial in the Jensen case as in the case at bar are the present expenses of the parties and 
how it relates to their respective incomes. In the Jensen case the parties presented 
extensive evidence on the parties' present expenses which allowed the court to analyze 
the parties respective resources. However here that is not possible. (R. p.195.) 
Evidence that he specifically never asked to come forth at pre-trial suddenly would have been 
beneficial and even crucial as it was in the Jensen case. His entire ruling came down to this. He 
was the Magistrate on the Jensen case. This makes no sense. A decision to modify child support 
is left to the "sound discretion" of the trial court. Franks v. Franks, 119 Idaho 997 (Ct. App. 
1991); Harris v. Carter, 146 Idaho 22 (Ct. App. 2008) .. 
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Summary of the Three Above Issues 
The magistrate's legal contortions appear to be the product of an after-the-fact attempt to 
legally justify a clearly erroneous conclusion. The judge's conduct in this action both 
at the hearing and the post hoc rationalization reflected in the judgment - is sufficiently 
disturbing as to warra11t further inquiry by the Idaho Judicial Cotmcil. Carr v. Edgar, 
Opinion No. 103, September 26, 2014. 
The magistrate here was also the Honorable Terry R. McDaniel. This case before this 
Court is strikingly similar in nature. Although there were three issues here, Stacy hopes that this 
Court can see how the story unwound from pre-trial to trial to post-trial. It is not really specific 
issues so much as it is that the whole case was an issue from the very, very beginning at pre-
trial. 
The District Court Erred In Affirming That The Tax Exemptions 
Should Be Assigned To Stacy When They Are Of Zero Benefit to Mark 
The magistrate assigned the tax exemptions to Stacy lowering her child support. With Mark's 
income over the threshold of $427,550, derives zero benefit from taking them. The district court 
opinion stated that the magistrate did what the guidelines informed him to do and did not err by 
following the guidelines. (R- 000368) This is a true statement. 
Awards of child support and attorney fees are committed to the trial court's sound 
discretion. However, they are not insignificant-or worthy only of summary treatment-merely 
because they are discretionary. When a judge rules on child support, he dedicates a certain level 
of future resources to the care and development of children. His ruling profoundly affects the 
standards of living enjoyed by the children and by both of their parents. Bailey v. Bailey, I 07 
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Idaho 324,329,689 P.2d 216,221 (Ct. App. 1984) (internal citation omitted). Tax exemptions 
are part of the child support calculation. The reason for the child support statute, and the 
Guidelines it authorizes, is to make sure judges are making decisions in the children's best 
interests. Gamer v. Garner, Supra. The magistrate once again failed to put the children first, but 
at least he did follow the rules. 
Tax code since 2009 actually states that in cases of joint custody where the children 
spending equal amount of time with each parent, that the tax exemptions go to the person with 
the higher income. Which is the case in this case, and which makes no common sense. Mark 
would take them, get zero credit and Stacy would have to pay more taxes. Wouldn't it be better 
for at least one of the parents to save some money on taxes which then trickles down to the 
children? It will be interesting to see how this issue involves. 
The District Court Erred By Not Awarding Attorney's Fees To Stacy Pursuant to 
I.C. § 32-704, I.C §32-705, I.C §12-121 and Section XIII Of The MOU Attached To 
The Decree (R. p. 45) 
The Court found "further, this Court has reviewed and considered the factors under Idaho 
Code, §32-704 and Idaho Code, §32-705 and find that Stacy has sufficient assets and financial 
resources to pay for her attorney fees incurred in this matter". The court failed to cite authority 
for this ruling or permit a procedure per Rule 54, I.R.C.P. The Court did not make a specific 
finding on I. C., §32-705 factors which was error. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955 (1993). 
In regard to the agreement in the MOU, Stacy does realize it was not brought up at trial 
ad the district court stated in the opinion. 
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Additionally there is a very recent case that was heard in front of the Idaho Court of Appeals, 
Davies v. Davies, 2016 Opinion No. 19, Filed: March 2, 2016. 
In order for a trial court to award attorney fees established by LC. § 32-704(3), it is necessary 
that the court consider the factors set forth in LC. § 32-705. Jensen v. Jensen, 128 Idaho 600, 
607,917 P.2d 757, 764 (1996). Additionally, in Jensen the Idaho Supreme Court found that a 
disparity in income is sufficient to support a magistrate's conclusion that the party with the 
higher income should pay a share of the other party's attorney fees under LC. § 32-704. 
Jensen, 128 Idaho at 607, 917 P.2d at 764. - Davies v. Davies, Supra 
In Davies, after hearing argument from both sides, the magistrate explained: 
It appears to me, post-divorce proceedings, under 32-704, 32-705, I am to consider 
the relative assets of the parties, their ability to essentially finance the litigation and to 
meet ordinary expenses. And I also think it comes with some discretion in making a 
decision whether or not to award fees based upon the findings. 
It's pretty clear that [David] has far more resources than [Susan] in this case. If the 
objective is to get [Susan] to waste all of her resources in responding to this litigation, 
that's not an objective reason that can be supported either by the policy or the statute. 
I don't understand what the depositions of Scout leaders is in the context of this case. 
There doesn't--there's not any objective reason offered to me why that's a legitimate 
litigation step. 
It appears to me that even though [Susan] did file the initial complaint and has filed a 
number of her own motions, those motions tended to be, in my view at least, 
reasonably calculated to get at the issues that come up in these types of cases. 
[David's] motions, and what I've heard about the discovery tactics, seems to me more 
trying to increase the burden on [Susan] in defending the lawsuit or prosecuting the 
lawsuit. That's my impression, based upon all of the affidavits that I have read up to 
this point. I think it's fair to award [Susan] attorneys[] fees. I'm not going to give her 
$10,000. I will make an award of$7,500 to be paid within 30 days. 
During a hearing on the motion for attorney fees, the magistrate explained: 
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Under 12-121 I can't award attorney fees ... without finding that the action was 
unreasonable, frivolous or without foundation in either its commencement or its 
pursuit. There were many things that it seems to me were fairly debatable questions 
of law and fact. But there were many other actions that weren't. 
Based upon that explanation, the magistrate denied Susan's request for attorney fees 
under Sections 12-121 and 12-123. However, later in the hearing the magistrate held: 
I've addressed 12-121 and in a way 12-123. I also think that there's support for an 
award under 32-704, 32-705. I think there is when considering the incomes of and 
expenses as a whole a much greater ability on [David's] part to ... afford the 
attorney[] fees that he was largely responsible for generating. And on that basis we'll 
also award the amounts that I've indicated. 
Accordingly, the magistrate ordered David to pay a portion of Susan's costs and attorney 
fees. As explained above, regarding the prior award of attorney fees, there is support for the 
award under the authority of LC. § 32-704 and Jensen due to the discrepancy between 
David's and Susan's incomes. Thus, the district court did not err in affirming either of the 
magistrate's awards of attorney fees to Susan. Davies v. Davies, Supra. 
Mark's 2013 income at trial was $550,000. Stacy's imputed income was $38,000. 
Attorney's fees should like child support exclude spouse income and property settlement, which 
places a large disparity in incomes. Stacy's husband income was $11,665.33 per month. (Tr. p. 
92, Ls 18-22.) That is $139,984 per year. Stacy had a property settlement of $2,844 per month. 
The Magistrate stated Stacy had sufficient funds with her imputed income, her husband's salary, 
and her community property and she could afford her own attorney's fees. Stacy's attorney's 
fees are about one half of her husband's income. 
Stacy's husband's income plus imputed income is 36% of Mark's income. Adding 
community property is 42% of Mark's income. Even the Magistrate acknowledges that it is clear 
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Under 12-121 I can't award attorney fees ... without finding that the action was 
unreasonable, frivolous or without foundation in either its commencement or its 
pursuit. There were many things that it seems to me were fairly debatable questions 
of law and fact. But there were many other actions that weren't. 
Based upon that explanation, the magistrate denied Susan's request for attorney fees 
under Sections 12-121 and 12-123. However, later in the hearing the magistrate held: 
I've addressed 12-121 and in a way 12-123. I also think that there's support for an 
award under 32-704, 32-705. I think there is when considering the incomes of and 
expenses as a whole a much greater ability on [David's] part to ... afford the 
attorney[] fees that he was largely responsible for generating. And on that basis we'll 
also award the amounts that I've indicated. 
Accordingly, the magistrate ordered David to pay a portion of Susan's costs and attorney 
fees. As explained above, regarding the prior award of attorney fees, there is support for the 
award under the authority of I.C. § 32-704 and Jensen due to the discrepancy between 
David's and Susan's incomes. Thus, the district court did not err in affirming either of the 
magistrate's awards of attorney fees to Susan. Davies v. Davies, Supra. 
Mark's 2013 income at trial was $550,000. Stacy's imputed income was $38,000. 
Attorney's fees should like child support exclude spouse income and property settlement, which 
places a large disparity in incomes. Stacy's husband income was $11,665.33 per month. (Tr. p. 
92, Ls 18-22.) That is $139,984 per year. Stacy had a property settlement of $2,844 per month. 
The Magistrate stated Stacy had sufficient funds with her imputed income, her husband's salary, 
and her community property and she could afford her own attorney's fees. Stacy's attorney's 
fees are about one half of her husband's income. 
Stacy's husband's income plus imputed income is 36% of Mark's income. Adding 
community property is 42% of Mark's income. Even the Magistrate acknowledges that it is clear 
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Mark's refusal to accept the initial child support of $2,537 back in March of2013 in the 
Petition to Modify drove this case to court. The choice to refuse to request the Quicken records 
after they were revealed in the deposition, and leave the objection to trial is abusing the rules of 
procedure, and driving up court costs of a trial that could have been avoided or severely 
shortened. That seems frivolous in nature. 
Hard and firm rulings, like the Honorable Reardon's, will hopefully encourage parties 
and attorneys to follow the rules. Stacy respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court 
ruling and to award her attorney's fees under LC. § 32-704, LC §32-705, LC § 12-121. 
CONCLUSION 
This was supposed to be very simple and straightforward case of child support, 10 -15 
minutes long the Magisrate stated at the pre-trial. Stacy thought reconciled Quicken records 
would make things much easier in terms of getting the court the data that it needed to make a 
fair and reasonable determination on child support. Especially given the new Idaho Rules 
Family Law Procedure and new rule of evidence. But that was not to be with this case. 
Argument shows that there was substantial and competent evidence in the record, 
proving that Exhibits 11, 11-A, and Exhibit 35 should have been admitted into evidence. 
The objection ed under I.RE. 1006 was that the physical bank statements had not been 
made available, but the Quicken Records were also part of the originals. There was no 
objection to the Quicken Records not being made available by Stacy. Without the Quicken 
Records one can't authenticate a report by Quicken Category with a bank statement. Stacy 
asked to explain how the exhibits were created and was denied that right by the magistrate. 
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That is a severe abuse of discretion when we are talking about the only evidence that he wanted 
to see. With all due respect not everyone uses financial software and it may need some 
explaining as to how it works before one can understand what the underlying source data really 
1s. That is all Stacy was trying to do. 
Regardless of that, the Quicken records which comprise the Exhibits at trial are clearly 
records of regularly conducted activity under the new IRFLP 102.B.2. The Exhibits should 
have been admitted regardless of the previous objection . The magistrate ignored that rule 
which is abuse of discretion. 
If Exhibit 11 is in evidence now you are looking at the budget on page 27 of this brief 
with new eyes. Stacy respectfully requests that the decision of the district court be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Stacy Loughmiller, prose 
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